While auditor attestation of the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting (ICFR) is required for firms with a public float of more than $75 million (accelerated filers), the SEC has delayed auditor attestation for non-accelerated filers several times. The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 exempts non-accelerated filers from auditor attestation. Does auditor attestation add value incremental to the certifications by management on the effectiveness of ICFR, particularly for small firms? We examine the relation between auditor attestation and revenue quality for a sample of non-accelerated filers and small accelerated filers. We find that discretionary (abnormal) revenues, our proxy for revenue quality, are lower by about 1.3% of total assets for accelerated filers relative to non-accelerated filers. This finding holds even among firms whose management has certified their ICFR to be effective. Further, we find that the association between past earnings and current period cash flows is higher for accelerated filers. Overall, the findings support the notion that auditor attestation of the effectiveness of ICFR benefits small accelerated filers via higher revenue quality. Results of our market valuation tests indicate that both the book value of equity and the earnings of accelerated filers are valued more relative to non-accelerated filers. These results suggest that investors in small public firms regard auditors' attestation of the effectiveness of ICFR adds value via higher revenue quality relative to firms that are not required to submit themselves to additional scrutiny by their auditors. We believe our findings are timely and potentially informative to regulators, investors, and others.
I. INTRODUCTION
Regulators regard a good internal control system as the foundation for high-quality financial reporting (PCAOB 2004; Donaldson 2005; and 404(a) apply to both non-accelerated filers and accelerated filers. However, non-accelerated filers were never subject to auditor attestation of the effectiveness of ICFR. Thus, this setting presents a natural experiment to study the potential value of auditor attestation of the effectiveness of ICFR.
Focusing on firms with less than $125 million and more than $25 million in total assets, we examine two research questions. First, is there a difference in the revenue quality of accelerated filers that are subject to auditor attestation of ICFR and non-accelerated filers? If auditor attestation of the effectiveness of ICFR has an incremental effect on the quality of revenue, then revenue quality should be higher for accelerated filers relative to non-accelerated filers, ceteris paribus. On the other hand, for small firms, management certifications as well as an audit of financial statements might be sufficient to enhance revenue quality.
We focus on revenue quality for the following reasons. Revenue growth is perhaps the most important driver of firm valuation, especially for small firms (Jegadeesh and Livnat 2006) .
Revenue is the largest component of earnings and is subject to discretion (Stubben 2010) . Prior research finds that more than 70% of SEC enforcement actions involve revenue manipulation (Dechow and Schrand 2004) .
Our second research question examines whether there is a difference in the investor valuation of accelerated filers relative to non-accelerated filers. If investors value auditor attestation of the effectiveness of ICFR, then financial statement elements, such as book value of equity and earnings should be valued more for accelerated filers relative to non-accelerated filers. However, compliance with Section 404(b) also imposes significant cost of compliance on small firms. Thus, the net effect of auditor attestation on firm value is an empirical issue.
Our study is motivated by the following reasons. First, much of the empirical accounting research, including prior research on internal controls focuses on large firms. Evidence on small firms is important because they employ nearly half of all Americans, account for a large proportion of businesses, and face significant financial reporting challenges (Federal Reserve Bank of New York 2010; Beasley et al. 1999) . Aguilar (2009) , a SEC Commissioner, argues that auditor attestation of the effectiveness of ICFR is important for small firms because managers may be able to dominate and override existing internal controls. 2 Further, these companies may lack the necessary resources needed to maintain appropriate technical controls.
However, some commentators on SOX argue that auditor attestation of the effectiveness of ICFR may not be needed. For example, Cutler (2006) states, "In small firms, even a drastically reduced standard for internal controls may be sufficient, since the structure is far less complex and the financial condition of the company is much more transparent." Would management certification of the effectiveness of ICFR suffice for small firms? We contribute to the literature by providing empirical evidence on the incremental impact of compliance with Section 404(b)
on the revenue quality of small firms.
Second, it is estimated that more than 6,000 public companies would be exempt from auditor attestation of internal controls due to the DF Act (Aguilar 2009 ). What are the financial reporting implications of exempting non-accelerated filers from Section 404(b) of SOX?
2 One recent example of the implications of exempting small firms from Section 404(b) comes from the breathtaking fraud at Koss Corp, a maker of stereo headphones with a market capitalization of $32 million. Koss's long-time Vice President of Finance and Secretary was indicted on six counts of wire fraud amounting to $31 million over the course of five years to pay for clothing, furs, jewelry, and other items (Whitehouse 2010) . Koss had no formal internal audit function, and as a non-accelerated filer it was not required to get an auditor's opinion on its internal controls.
Currently, there is limited empirical evidence on whether there is a difference between the revenue quality of accelerated filers and non-accelerated filers. Our objective is to inform regulators, investors, and others of the potential consequences of exempting non-accelerated filers from Section 404(b) of SOX.
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Third, regulators might extend the exemption from Section 404(b) of SOX to more small firms. The DF Act requires the SEC to study and report to Congress by the spring of 2011 how the cost of compliance with Section 404(b) for firms with a market capitalization between $75 million and $250 million could be reduced. We believe our findings are potentially relevant to the Congress as further exemptions from Section 404(b) are debated.
Our measure of revenue quality follows Stubben (2010) . He presents evidence that his measure of discretionary revenues is more powerful than commonly used accrual models. He finds that his model is more likely than accrual models to detect a combination of revenue and expense manipulation. Further, while his measure detects earnings management by firms subject to enforcement actions by the SEC, the performance-matched discretionary accruals models do not. We also use the ability of past earnings to predict future cash flows, a fundamental objective of financial reporting (FASB 1978) , as a supplementary measure.
Our sample period covers years 2007 through 2009 during which Section 404(a) (management's report on the effectiveness of ICFR) is required for both accelerated and nonaccelerated filers. During this period, compliance with Section 404(b) was required only for 3 The SEC was not in favor of exempting non-accelerated filers from Section 404(b) (SEC 2003 We document several key findings. First, on average, discretionary (abnormal) revenues are lower by about 1.3% of total assets for accelerated filers relative to non-accelerated filers.
This finding is significant at the 0.01 level and robust to controlling for several firm characteristics, such as size, market-to-book, leverage, performance, sales growth, operating cycle, past accruals, cash flow volatility, auditor type and others. Our results are qualitatively similar when we match accelerated and non-accelerated observations by year, industry, and total assets.
Second, we exclude observations with ineffective internal controls, i.e., no significant deficiency and examine a sample of non-accelerated filers whose managers have certified under Section 404(a) that their internal controls are effective, along with a sample of accelerated filers whose managers and auditors have certified their internal controls to be effective. Once again, we find that the discretionary revenues are lower by about 1.5% for accelerated filers relative to non-accelerated filers (significant at the 0.01 level). This finding indicates that even among firms that claim to have effective internal controls, abnormal revenues are lower i.e., higher revenue quality for accelerated filers relative to non-accelerated filers.
Third, we also identify a sample firms that appear to have changed their status from being an accelerated filer to a non-accelerated filer. If the higher revenue quality associated with accelerated filers is due to auditor attestation of the effectiveness of ICFR, then we should expect a lower revenue quality for those firms exiting the accelerated filer status. We find that discretionary revenues have increased by about 1.2% of total assets following the change from an accelerated filer to a non-accelerated filer (significant at the 0.01 level).
Fourth, we find that the association between past earnings and current period cash flows, a commonly used measure of earnings quality, is higher (significant at the 0.01 level) for accelerated observations relative to non-accelerated observations. In other words, the predictive value of earnings for future cash flows is higher for accelerated filers.
Fifth, results of our market valuation tests indicate that the book value of equity of accelerated filers is valued more by investors relative to the book value of equity of nonaccelerated filers (significant at the 0.01 level). Finally, when we retain only those observations with effective internal controls for both accelerated and non-accelerated filers, we find that both the book value of equity and the earnings of accelerated filers are valued more relative to the book value of equity and the earnings of non-accelerated filers. These results are significant at the 0.01 level. We obtain similar results when we match accelerated and non-accelerated observations by year, industry, and total assets.
Overall, our results are consistent with higher revenue quality for small accelerated filers relative to non-accelerated filers after controlling for firm size and other characteristics. Further, when we restrict the sample to accelerated filers with auditor attested effective internal controls and non-accelerated filers with only manager certified effective internal controls, we find that the investor valuation of book value of equity and earnings are higher for accelerated filers. Our findings support the notion that investors in small public firms regard auditors' assessment of the effectiveness of internal controls adds value via higher revenue and earnings quality relative to firms that are not required to submit themselves to additional scrutiny by their auditors. We believe our findings are timely and potentially informative to capital market participants.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section summarizes the development of regulation on internal controls and prior research on the relation between internal control and financial reporting quality. The hypothesis and research design are presented in section three, followed by sample selection. Results are in section five, conclusions in section six.
II. BACKGROUND AND PRIOR RESEARCH

Development of Internal Control Regulation
Internal control regulation for U. 
Prior Research
There is a growing literature on internal control regulation under Sections 302 and 404 of SOX. Doyle et al. (2007) (2008) provide evidence that changes in internal control effectiveness can impact accrual quality. In a recent study, using a sample of smaller accelerated filers and larger non-accelerated filers Nagy 
III. HYPOTHESIS AND RESEARCH DESIGN
Impact of Auditor Attestation of Internal Controls on Revenue Quality
Investment in internal control systems can add value to an organization via operating efficiencies, safeguarding assets, more reliable financial statements, and realizing an organization's goals and objectives. reports three significant findings. First, the rates of restatements of financial statements after a company claimed to have effective internal controls over financial reporting were 5.1% for accelerated filers and 7.4% for non-accelerated filers, i.e., 46% higher for non-accelerated filers.
Second, since the internal control assessment process occurs before SOX 404 disclosure, the study also looked at restatements that occurred within the 90 days prior to the SOX disclosure and found that among firms that reported ineffective internal controls, the rate of restatement for non-accelerated filers increased from 12.47% to 15.79%, while for accelerated filers the rate jumped from 12.97% to 26.51%, indicating that auditor involvement in internal control assessment increases the likelihood of restatements by client firms. Third, while only two accelerated filers were silent or ambiguous about the effectiveness of their internal controls, 202
non-accelerated filers failed to properly disclose the status of internal controls and, subsequently, 30 of them restated their financial statements. This suggests that disclosures under Section 404(a) are potentially misleading or uninformative for some non-accelerated filers. Overall, these findings indicate that auditor attestation of management's assessment of the effectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting enhances financial reporting quality.
However, some commentators on SOX argue that other provisions of SOX, such as the certifications by the CEO and CFO required under Section 302, as well as the management's assessment of internal controls required under Section 404(a), board independence, audit committee independence, and restrictions on nonaudit services might be sufficient for small firms (Cutler 2006) . Therefore, we present our hypothesis in null form is as follows:
H: There is no difference in revenue quality between small accelerated filers and nonaccelerated filers.
Revenue Quality of Accelerated Filers vs. Non-accelerated Filers
In this section we describe the research design concerning our first research question whether there is a difference in the revenue quality of accelerated filers and non-accelerated filers. We do this by using three different, though not mutually exclusive, samples of accelerated and non-accelerated filers. All samples are for the years 2007 through 2009. Our first sample includes observations with total assets between $25 million and $125 million. We exclude observations with less than $25 million to exclude very small non-accelerated filers and to ensure that the non-accelerated and the accelerated filers in our sample are comparable in terms of firm size.
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Our second sample excludes observations with ineffective internal controls, i.e., we focus on non-accelerated filers and accelerated filers with no significant deficiencies in their ICFR.
Thus, this sample consists of observations with a "clean opinion" from the management (for both accelerated and non-accelerated filers) and auditors (for accelerated filers). This is an important sample because it could shed light on whether auditor attestation adds value even in firms that claim to have effective ICFR. Our third sample consists of accelerated and non-accelerated observations matched on year, industry, and beginning total assets. This sample mitigates the concern that our results are driven by firm size.
Our measure of revenue quality is the discretionary (abnormal) revenues measure developed by Stubben (2010) . He compares his discretionary revenue models with several commonly used accrual models, such as the Jones model, modified Jones model, and Dechow and Dichev measure of accruals quality by assessing the models' abilities to detect simulated revenue and expense manipulations. He uses simulation as well as actual cases of revenue and expense manipulation by firms subject to enforcement by the SEC. Overall, his findings indicate that the discretionary revenue models are less biased, better specified, and more powerful than commonly used accrual models. Most importantly, his revenue models detect actual instances of manipulation while accrual models do not.
We estimate discretionary revenues using his conditional revenue model 7 :
We define the variables as follows: All variables are scaled by average total assets. See the appendix for a list of variables.
[Insert Appendix About Here]
DREV, the residual from model (1) above is our measure of discretionary revenues.
Higher values of DREV indicate greater revenue (earnings) management, i.e., lower revenue quality.
Next, we estimate a regression of discretionary revenues on a set of control variables and AF, our variable of interest. AF equals 1 for accelerated filers and 0 for non-accelerated filers.
Since DREV, our dependent variable, is similar to discretionary accruals, we use a set of controls (firm characteristics) that have been identified in prior research as determinants of discretionary accruals. For example, Dechow and Dichev (2002) Table 1 for industry classifications).
Other variables are the same as previously defined.
Following the prior research, we expect a positive relation of discretionary revenues with 
IV. SAMPLE SELECTION
In this section we describe the sample for the discretionary revenues model. Analytics. We obtain financial data from Compustat. After merging these two datasets, we retain firm-years for which all necessary data are available. We include only firm-years with fiscal year-end in December. We exclude the financial service and utility industries. Further, to focus on small firms we exclude firm-years with beginning total assets less than $25 million or greater than $125 million. Our final sample consists of 783 firm-years and 427 unique firms, of which 66% of total firm-years (520 firm-years) and 67% of unique firms (286 firms) represent accelerated filers. [Insert Table 2 About Here]
V. RESULTS
Results of Revenue Quality of Accelerated Filers vs. Non-accelerated Filers
Results of model (2) are in Table 4 .
We find that the coefficient on AF is -0.015 (significant at the 0.01 level). This indicates that on average, discretionary revenues are lower by about 1.5% of total assets for accelerated filers relative to non-accelerated filers. This finding is consistent with the result in Table 3 and indicates that the higher revenue quality associated with accelerated filers holds even among observations with effective ICFR.
[Insert Table 4 About Here]
To mitigate the concern that our results could be driven by firm size, we match accelerated and non-accelerated observations by year, two-digit SIC, and beginning total assets and re-estimate model (2). We do not impose a size constraint and the number of observations available for this test is 1,180. 11 The results are in Table 5 . SIZE is not significant and the variable of interest, AF is -0.008 and significant at the 0.05 level. Overall, findings in Tables 3   through 5 support the notion that compliance with Section 404(b) is associated with higher revenue quality.
[Insert Table 5 About Here]
Sensitivity Analyses
We also perform a number of sensitivity checks and additional analyses to assess the robustness of our findings to alternative size cutoffs, size proxy, specifications, and measures of earnings quality. We discuss them below. 2009. Thus, we reestimate model (2) using 150 (pre and post-status change) observations. We replace AF with an indicator variable POST that equals 1 for the year when a firm became a nonaccelerated filer (the year of the change in the compliance status) 0 for the year before the change. The results are in Table 6 . We find that the coefficient on POST is 0.012 (significant at the 0.01 level). This indicates that discretionary revenues have increased by about 1.2% of total assets following the change from an accelerated filer to a non-accelerated filer. 13 This finding is consistent with the findings in Tables 3 through 5 and supports the notion that auditor attestation of ICFR has a favorable impact on revenue quality.
[Insert Table 6 About Here]
12 Gao et al. (2009) provide evidence that some non-accelerated filers attempt to stay small to avoid compliance with Section 404(b) of SOX. 13 We verify that out of 150 firm-year observations in Table 6 (i.e., 75 firms) market value of equity is less than $50 million for 100 observations in the year following the status change to non-accelerated filers. When we reestimate model (2) using these observations, we find that the coefficient on POST is 0.010 (significant at the 0.10 level for a one-tailed test).
Controlling for internal control weakness.
Our results are robust to controlling for internal weakness, i.e., an adverse opinion under Section 404(b). While internal control weakness is insignificant, the coefficient on AF is negative and significant at the 0.01 level.
Alternative measures of revenue and earnings quality. We use two additional measures of revenue and earnings quality. First, is the discretionary revenue estimated from Stubben's (2010) revenue model:
We define the variables as follows: Table 3 . This finding once again indicates that revenue quality is higher for accelerated filers relative to nonaccelerated filers.
We also use the ability of past earnings to predict current period cash flows as a measure of earnings quality. We focus on cash flow prediction because that is the primary objective of financial reporting, and the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB 1978, paragraph 37) states, "financial reporting should provide information to help investors, creditors, and others assess the amounts, timing and uncertainty of prospective net cash inflows to the related enterprise." Examples of other studies that examine the predictive ability of earnings for future cash flows are Greenberg et al. (1986 ), Finger (1994 , Krishnan and Largay (2000), Barth et al. (2001 ), Mikhail et al. (2003 , and Altamuro and Beatty (2009) .
We estimate the following model: Table 1 for industry classifications).
Consistent with prior research, we expect a positive coefficient on α 2 . The coefficient of interest here is α 3 . A positive coefficient would be consistent with greater earnings quality for accelerated filers relative to non-accelerated filers.
Results of model (4) are in Table 7 . Coefficients on industry-dummy variables are not This finding is consistent with the results based on our revenue quality measure, discretionary revenues. Collectively, our results support the notion that earnings quality is higher for accelerated observations relative to non-accelerated observations.
[Insert Table 7 About Here]
Market Valuation of Accelerated vs. Non-accelerated Filers
Next, we present the results of our second research question, i.e., whether investor valuation of accelerated filers reflects the higher revenue and earnings quality relative to nonaccelerated filers. Following the results in Tables 3 through 5, We define the variables as follows: Consistent with prior research, we expect a positive coefficient on β 1 , β 2 , and β 3 . We also predict a positive coefficient for our coefficients of interest, β 5 and β 6 . No prediction is offered for β 4 and β 7 . Results of model (5) are in Table 8 . Coefficients on industry-dummy variables are not tabulated. The adjusted R 2 is 47.69%. The coefficient on BVE is positive and significant at the 0.01 level. The coefficient on NI is also positive and significant at the 0.10 level. SGROW2 is positive and significant. These findings indicate that book value of equity, net income, and sales growth are positively associated with the market valuation of equity. The coefficient on AF is positive and significant at the 0.01 level, indicating that on average, the stock market valuation is higher for accelerated filers relative to non-accelerated filers. Turning to the variable of interest, the coefficient on AF×BVE is 1.007 and significant at the 0.01 level, indicating that the book value of equity of accelerated filers is valued more than the book value of equity of non-accelerated filers. The coefficient on AF×NI is negative and insignificant. In summary, these findings are consistent with the notion that auditor attestation of the effectiveness of ICFR has a favorable effect on the association between book value of equity and market value of equity for accelerated filers.
[Insert Table 8 About Here]
We re-estimate model (5) after excluding observations with ineffective internal control (significant deficiencies in ICFR). We retain non-accelerated observations with a "clean" opinion under Sections 302 and 404(a) and accelerated observations with a "clean" opinion under Sections 302, 404(a), and (b). The number of observations available for this test is 588 and the results are in Table 9 . The coefficients on AF×BVE and AF×NI are, respectively, 0.667 and 1.114 (both coefficients are significant at the 0.01 level). This indicates that even among firms with effective ICFR, book value of equity and net income are valued more for accelerated filers relative to non-accelerated filers.
[Insert Table 9 About Here]
We also match accelerated and non-accelerated observations by year, two-digit SIC, and beginning total assets and re-estimate model (5). We do not impose a size constraint for this test and the number of observations equals 1,948. The results are in Table 10 . The variables of interest, AF×BVE and AF×NI are, respectively, 0.644 (significant at the 0.01 level) and 1.012 (significant at the 0.05 level). 14 Overall, findings in Tables 8 through 10 are consistent with the   results in Tables 3 through 5 and support the notion that the higher revenue and earnings quality associated with accelerated filers has a favorable impact on the market valuation of equity of accelerated filers.
[Insert Table 10 About Here]
We also re-estimate model (5) after including the mean percent of shares held by institutional investors to proxy for visibility and trading to mitigate the concern that the higher valuation for accelerated filers might be due to the higher visibility and trading activities for accelerated filers relative to non-accelerated filers. We find that the coefficient on AF×BVE is 0.971 (significant at the 0.001 level) and the coefficient on AF×NI is insignificant.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
While prior research has examined the relation between internal control over financial reporting and financial reporting quality for large firms, empirical evidence on the potential benefits of internal controls for small firms is limited. Auditor attestation of the effectiveness of internal controls is particularly valuable for small firms as these firms may lack the necessary resources needed to maintain appropriate technical controls. Also, managers in small firms may override existing internal controls. However, the recently passed Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 exempts non-accelerated filers (firms with a public float of less than $75 million) from auditor attestation of internal controls. This study examines whether revenue quality is higher for small accelerated filers that are subject to auditor attestation relative to non-accelerated filers that are required to disclose only management certification of the effectiveness of internal controls. Put it differently, we examine whether auditor attestation adds value incremental to management's assurance on internal controls.
Our sample consists of firms with less than $125 million and more than $25 million in assets and we focus on years 2007 through 2009. During this period, management certification of internal controls is required for both accelerated and non-accelerated filers. However, auditor attestation of internal controls is required only for accelerated filers. Thus, a comparison of small accelerated filers with non-accelerated filers could potentially be informative for understanding the incremental effect of auditor attestation on financial reporting quality.
Using Stubben's (2010) discretionary (abnormal) revenues as a proxy for revenue quality, we find that on average, discretionary revenues are lower by about 1.3% of total assets for accelerated filers relative to non-accelerated filers. Further, compared to non-accelerated filers whose managers have certified that their internal controls are effective, discretionary revenues of accelerated filers with effective internal controls certified by their auditor are lower. Thus, even among firms that claim to have effective internal controls, revenue quality is higher for accelerated filers relative to non-accelerated filers. We also find that the predictive value of earnings for future cash flows is higher for accelerated filers.
Results of our market valuation tests indicate that both the book value of equity and the earnings of accelerated filers are valued more relative to the book value equity and the earnings of non-accelerated filers. Overall, our findings support the notion that investors in small public firms regard auditors' assessment of the effectiveness of internal controls adds value via higher revenue quality relative to firms that are not required to submit themselves to additional scrutiny by their auditors.
We believe our findings are timely and have important implications for members of the U.S. Congress, the SEC, managers, audit committee members, and investors. Our results support the notion that an auditor's opinion on the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting adds value beyond certifications provided by management. Currently, the SEC is studying how the cost of compliance with Section 404(b) for small accelerated filers could be reduced. Thus, the decision to exempt more firms from auditor attestation of internal controls needs to be carefully balanced against the potential savings in compliance cost. All variables scaled by average total assets.
Variables in model (2) SIZE
= The natural log of the firm's market value of equity at fiscal year-end measured in millions of dollars; MTB = Market value of equity divided by book value of assets; LEV = The firm's long-term debt divided by its total assets; LOSS = An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm reports a loss in the current year, and 0 otherwise; CFO = Cash flow from operations scaled by beginning of year total assets; SGROW = Sales growth defined as sales in year t less sales in year t-1 scaled by sales in year t; Z = Zmijewski's (1984) probability of bankruptcy score. Z-score calculated as: -4.3 -4.5 x net income scaled by total assets + 5.7 x total liability scaled by total assets -0.004 x current assets / current liability; LACC = Last year's total accruals equal to net income before extraordinary items minus operating cash flows scaled by beginning of year total assets; LOPCYCL = The natural log of operating cycle, measured by accounts receivable cycle and inventory cycle (360 x averages of account receivables / sales + 360 x average of inventories /cost of goods sold and each cycle is truncated at 360 days); VOLCFO = Standard deviation of cash flow from operations deflated by average total assets over year t-4 to year t; VOLSALE = Standard deviation of sales deflated by average total assets over year t-4 to year t. MA = An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm is engaged in a merger or acquisition in the current year, and 0 otherwise; FINANCE = An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm issues equity or debt in the subsequent year, and 0 otherwise; LITIGN = An indicator variables that equals 1 if the firm operates in a high litigation industry (with SIC of 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 3600-3674, 5200-5961, and 7370-7374) = Eleven industry dummy variables measured at the two-digit SIC level to capture industry-wide effects (see Table 1 for industry classifications). = Eleven industry dummy variables measured at the two-digit SIC level to capture industry-wide effects (see Table 1 for industry classifications).
Variables in model (
Variables in model (5) P = Common stock price per share measured at the end of three months after fiscal year-end; BVE = Book value of equity divided by the number of shares outstanding; NI = Net income divided by the number of shares outstanding; SGROW2 = Sales growth calculated as sales in year t minus sales in year t-2 scaled by sales in year t-2; AF = An indicator variable that equals 1 for accelerated filers and 0 for nonaccelerated filers. See the appendix for variable definitions. AF is an indicator variable that equals 1 for accelerated filers and 0 for non-accelerated filers. Discretionary revenues are estimated following Stubben (2010) . Data are for the years 2007 through 2009. Robust t-statistics are based on clustering of standard errors by firm and year. ***, **, and * indicate, respectively, statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels for a two-tailed test. See the appendix for variable definitions. POST equals 1 for the year when a firm became a nonaccelerated filer, i.e., the year of the change in the compliance status and 0 for the year before the change. Discretionary revenues are estimated following Stubben (2010) . Data are for the years 2005 through 2009 representing firms that complied with Section 404(b) in year t-1 but not in year t. Robust t-statistics are based on clustering of standard errors by firm and year. ***, **, and * indicate, respectively, statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels for a two-tailed test. 
